

(b)(3)(10 USC 130b);(b)(6)

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

WHEN DID YOU FIRST BECOME AWARE OF THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES? WERE YOU TOLD THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OR CONDITION OF THE CASUALTIES PRIOR TO LANDING?
NOT UNTIL WE HAD TAKEN OFF WAS I AWARE OF THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES I HAD ON THE AIRCRAFT.

NO.

WHAT WERE CATEGORIES OF THE PERSONNEL EVALUATED?

MY CASUALTIES:
3 URGENT
2 PRIORITY
7 EXPECTANT

WHAT ACTIONS DID YOU TAKE ENROUTE TO CARE FOR CASUALTIES?

PERFORMED INITIAL AND SECONDARY ASSESSMENTS ON ALL CASUALTIES, TOO. INCLUDE THE RE-EVALUATION OF ALL EXPECTANTS. ALL TREATMENTS PERFORMED WERE WITHIN MY SCOPE OF PRACTICE.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: The general authority for soliciting this information is 10 USC § 3012. More specific authority(ies) may exist.

Purpose: The purpose(s) for soliciting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the commander in determining what action to take with regard to:

17 FEB 07 AND THE RESULTING CASUALTIES

REASON OF (b)(1) 14a

Failure to disclose:

For soldiers and civilians not being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians not being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or Army regulations or applicable civilian personnel regulations.

For soldiers and civilians being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than that certain information might not otherwise be available to the commander for his or her decision in this matter.

Routine Uses: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies outside of the Department of Defense.

(b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6)

SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER

DATE

SWORN STATEMENT

Case 4:07-cv-06396-CW Document 1-4 Filed 05/29/2008 Page 3 of 65

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FT Campbell, KY	20070315	1157	

(b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
H/R 1607th SOAR(A)


9. (b)(6)

I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

It is my opinion that a faster response time to the site of 472's crash would ~~not have~~ changed the outcome of any of the patients involved.

The injuries sustained by those who perished were such that even if medical care was immediately available they would have died.

Nothing



15

45
45

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALES ON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing Follows

(b)(3)(10 USC 1305), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL, OR UNETHICAL INFLUENCE OR INFLUENCE.

(b)(3)(10 USC 1305), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15 day of MAR 07 at Fr Campbell KY

(b)(3)(10 USC 1305), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON SIGNING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45 (the proponent agency is PMO).

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 9 USC Section 2951; E.O. 13397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSAN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <i>LaFer-Real Army Medical Center</i>	2. DATE (MMYYAMDD) 2007/03/12	3. TIME 10:00 AM	4. FILE NUMBER [REDACTED]
(b)(3)(D) USC 130b, (b)(6)		7. GRADE/STATUS [REDACTED]	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NYC 2-1600 in SORRY FRICKY

9. (b)(3)(D) USC 130b, (b)(6)

10. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

You were present at some of the autopsies. In your opinion would a faster response time by medical personnel to the accident site have potentially resulted in fewer fatalities?

I witnessed 5 of the 8 autopsies. In my opinion, there was virtually nothing that could have been done medically to prevent those 5 deaths. A faster response time would not have changed the outcome.

(b)(6)

NOTHING FOLLOWS

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(6)	STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATUS: HOME STATION PJ MEDICAL OVERSIGHT DEPLOYED LOCATION PJ MEDICAL OVERSIGHT

PHYSICIAN RANK/NAME:

DATE

COMMENTS:

RANK/NAME:

DATE:

COMMENTS:

RANK/NAME:

DATE:

COMMENTS:

CRO FUNCTIONAL MANAGER

RANK/NAME:

DATE:

COMMENTS:

PARARESCUE FUNCTIONAL MANAGER

RANK/NAME:

DATE:

COMMENTS:

SERE FUNCTIONAL MANAGER

NAME/RANK:

DATE:

COMMENTS:

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT WRAMC DATED 12 MAR 07

9. STATEMENT (C)

NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(6)	
AFFIDAVIT	
<p>I, [REDACTED] HAVE READ (b)(6) WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THIS STATEMENT. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE STATEMENT IS NOTARIZED AND IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A SWORN STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR FRAUD.</p>	
<p>WITNESSED:</p> <p>Subscribed and administered on [REDACTED] at 12:50 EST [REDACTED] (b)(6)</p> <p>[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)</p> <p>[REDACTED] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)</p> <p>[REDACTED] (Authority To Administer Oath)</p>	
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: The general authority for soliciting this information is 10 USC § 3012. More specific authority(ies) may exist.

Purpose: The purpose(s) for soliciting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the commander in determining what action to take with regard to:

MEHT OF

(b)(1)1.4a

17 FEB 07 AND THE RESULTING CASUALTIES

Failure to disclose:

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For soldiers and civilians being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than that certain information might not otherwise be available to the commander for his or her decision in this matter.

Routine Uses: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government (b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6) of the Department of Defense.

SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER

DATE

1. MISSION NUMBER: RK4100JC309	2. OPERATION/EXERCISE NAME: OEF	3. TASKING AGENCY: JPRC	4. MISSION DATE (S): 17, 18 FEB 07
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5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISSION TASKING:

Emergency Landing of H-47 due to mechanical problems, 22 Souls on board (6 crew, 16 pax)

6. EXECUTING ORGANIZATION (Address/ phone #):

(b)(1)1.4a

APO/AE 09355
318-463-1221

7. TEAM MEMBERS:

Team Position	Rank & Name	Unit
1. TL	(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6), (b)(1)1.5a	
2. TM		
3. TL		
4. TM		
5. TL		
6. TM		

8. Report Prepared By [include email]:

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

9. NOTIFICATION DATE/TIME:
17 FEB 07 / 2203Z10. AGENCY/INDIVIDUAL:
JPRC11. METHOD:
MIRC

12. INITIAL SITUATION REPORTED: Emergency landing due to mechanical problems of H-47 with 22 persons on board

13. LOCATION:

(b)(1)1.4a

14. NUMBER OF ISOLATED PERSONNEL (IP):

22

15. REPORTED INJURIES OR MEDICAL CONDITION:

One person with fractured hip, several others with unknown injuries.

16. INSERTION

a. INFIL PLATFORM TYPE: 2X HH-60G

b. INSERTION METHOD: Airland

c. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 4

d. DEPLOYMENT ALTITUDE: 0 ft

e. WEATHER: Poor visibility, light snow

f. SEA STATE: -

g. INSERTION SUMMARY:

17 FEB 07

Pre Launch Info: MH-47 part of 3 ship, "landed" with mechanical problems with 22 people onboard. The two other ships (b)(1)1.4a are ahead and are conducting planned mission.

2233Z MIRC <JRPC-Dep> Launch (b)(1)1.4a at this time. Check with (b)(1)1.4a

2233Z MIRC <K1RQS> going to 5 min alert.

2251Z (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a wheels up (b)(1)1.4a en-route to (b)(1)1.4a "landing site".

2331Z Notified on aircraft radio that there were "several injured...one with pelvis injury".

From listening to CSARNET sat com traffic en route, PJ team leader and flight crews were under the impression that there were PJs on the ground managing the scene already. (from (b)(1)1.4a Flight?).

2348Z (b)(1)1.4a (F15) and (b)(1)1.4a (AC-130) were both on scene and a spot laser was provided to

PJ team leader was notified on intercom (b)(1).4a that Quick Reaction Force (QRF) platoon from (b)(1).4a was visible, in the distance, on the highway (RTE 1) and should be on scene shortly.

2351Z (b)(1).4a landed in "white out" conditions (Phased Infil Trailer Option). PJ (b)(1).4a immediately asked for (b)(1).4a PJ team. Temperature was 30 degrees F and 1 inch of snow was on the ground. Zero moon and very little illumination. Landing zone was flat ground in a wide open valley floor, 40 meters west of RTE 1.

17. ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVE

a. TERRAIN TYPE: Rural Farmland	b. ALTITUDE: 6100 ft. MSL
c. SURFACE TRAVEL REQUIRED [Y/N]: Y	d. DISTANCE: 40 Meters
e. METHOD OF TRAVEL: Foot	f. GROUND TIME INFIL TO EXFIL: 4.5 Hours
g. IP AUTHENTICATION METHOD: -	h. METHOD OF IP LOCATION USED: -
i. NUMBER OF IP's: N/A	j. TECHNICAL RESCUE REQUIRED (Y/N): Yes

k. MEDICAL TREATMENT REQUIRED ON SCENE:

--- SEE Paragraph #27 Below ---

I. SURFACE OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

2355Z Casualty Collection Point (CCP) established, began collecting and consolidating medical and extraction supplies gathered from (b)(1).4a Team assignments confirmed Patient Treatment: (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) Causality Collection Point: (b)(1).4a Overall Team Leader: (b)(1).4a

2356Z Initial sweep established 7 injured patients outside of aircraft. White light procedures established on scene. The remainder is estimated to be 15 all trapped inside the fuselage. Many were unresponsive. Every survivor on scene was "non-ambulatory" when the PJ team arrived. Scene size-up was relayed to (b)(1).4a on (b)(1).4a frequency.

Non trapped patients were immediately moved to Casualty Collection Point (CCP) triaged, and prepared for immediate evacuation.

18 Feb 07

0015Z Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Arrives. Pararescue Team Leader met with QRF platoon leader and was notified that he had 30 troops to assist on the CSAR operation. They (b)(1).4a (b)(1).4a provided far security, near security, 4 medics, 1 Physicians Assistant, and approximately 12 personnel to assist in the patient extraction, movement to CCP, and patient loading onto aircraft.

0040Z (b)(1).4a departs with 4 patients (non-ambulatory/litter). (b)(1).4a + (b)(1).4a departs with 5 patients (non-ambulatory/litter). (b)(1).4a en-route (b)(1).4a 1 KIA is left at CCP. 12 Pts are still trapped in the fuselage at this time.

Note: (b)(1).4a Flight was outfitted with newer style 200 gallon fuel tanks and external ammo cans. This provided more space than the standard HH-60.

0045Z Patients in the CCP are each personally assigned to one of the 4 QRF medics as they are removed from the fuselage. Army Physicians Assistant is also present in the CCP.

Due to the large number of patients and the amount of debris trapping each person, patients were "untangled" one by one until they were freed from the wreckage, then placed on skeds or litters then moved to the CCP.

Equipment used to get patients out the fuselage were: man portable hydraulic "jaws of life" (Holmatro), knives, trauma shears, bolt cutters, webbing, and human strength. Due to the confined space, many were passed/pulled hand over hand the length of the fuselage to the rear of the aircraft. Patients with obvious fractures had them "buddy splinted" in place before being removed from the wreckage.

All living patients were in various levels of consciousness and all had symptoms of hypothermia. The sight inside the helicopter fuselage was "gruesome". Living and dead were mixed and body positioning was "random" and intermixed with mission gear, loaded weapons, aircraft debris, and various fluids. The tallest portion of the cabin was at the rear of the ramp. The height there was 1 meter. As you went forward the height tapered smaller.

Note: Since this was (b)(1)1.4a CSAR aircraft (b)(1)1.4a, the PJ team was able to use onboard medical supplies, extrication equipment, and cold weather gear to augment materials available on-scene.

0100Z A Vehicle traveling (b)(1)1.4a refused to stop at check point so the QRF security team fires .50 cal machine gun "warning shots" towards vehicle to stop it.

Note: This is the main highway in the area and it passes within 50 meters of helicopter wreckage. There were obvious and constant threats to the ground friendly forces.

0200Z MH47 (b)(1)1.4a arrives on scene and loads 2 Urgent, 3 non-Urgent, 1 Expectant, and 6 Deceased patients, then departs for (b)(1)1.4a with (b)(1)1.4a Medics onboard. Patients on scene at this time: 1 Deceased / Entrapped.

QRF begins accounting for sensitive items on scene.

Orders are placed for PJ "heavy lift kit" from (b)(1)1.4a and wrecker from (b)(1)1.4a to assist in removing final patient from wreckage.

It begins to get light outside.

0210Z (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) return to scene on (b)(1)1.4a Extrication plan of final patient is started.

Photos and videos of scene are taken.

Final extrication of pilot included using:

-Debris from aircraft to form a hard base to lift off of
-3X man portable hydraulic "jaws of life" (Holmatro)
-15X ballistic plates from vests, and 6X MICH helmets to form cribbing

These materials allowed team to work in a confined space to lift the front 2008 head off of the trapped pilot. The pilot's right leg was also amputated at the knee to allow for extrication.

0330Z PJs (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) are wheels up from [REDACTED] on Army UH-60 bringing "heavy lift kit" escorted by AH-64.

0400Z Final Patient removed from fuselage.

0405Z Wrecker from (b)(1)1.4a arrives on scene.


0420Z Final patient loaded on (b)(1)1.4a mission equipment accounted for and loaded on (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a flight departs for (b)(1)1.4a

0502Z (b)(1)1.4a Arrives Charlie Med Ramp. Transfer final patient to medical staff.

0530Z (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) arrive crash site with heavy lift kit on Army UH-60 escorted by AH-64. They make a sweep for sensitive items and take photographs of scene.

0545Z (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) Depart fo (b)(1)1.4a

End of Mission



Rear ramp of MH-47 looking forward. Picture taken 18 FEB 07 approx. 0405Z



Front left of CH-47 looking west. Picture taken: 18FEB07 approx. 0405Z




Left side of MH-47 looking west. Photo taken 18 FEB 07 approx. 0530Z



Right Side of MH-47 looking North East. (note proximity to RTE 1) Photo taken: 18FEB 07 approx 0530 Z


(b)(1) 1.4a

General area map.



Nearby facilities. (note: location of RTE1)

(b)(1)14a (b)(1)14



18. RECOVERY

IP RECOVERY PLATFORM: HH-60'S, MH-47	b. IP RECOVERY METHOD: Airland
c. TEAM RECOVERY PLATFORM: 2XHH-60'S	d. TEAM RECOVERY METHOD: Airland
e.	
f. RECOVERY LOCATION: Same as infil site.	
g. RECOVERY SUMMARY: Once the last patient of the crash was extracted from the crash site [b](3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) extracted on [b](1)(4a) [b](3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) were extracted on [b](1)(4a) with the last patient.	

19. MISSION PLANNING:

Whiteboard, maps

20. ENROUTE TO OBJECTIVE:

SATCOM CSARNET, UHF Radios, NVGs, handheld GPS receivers, headlamps

21. INFILTRATION:

2XHH-60, Phased Trailer Option, Airland

22. ON SCENE (include communications, navigation, extrication tools, technical rescue, UAV):

3X Hydraulic (Holmatro) "jaws of life", (2 from [b](1)(4a) 1 from downed MH-47), Crash Axes, Ballistic Plates, MICH Helmets, Bolt Cutters, PRC-148, PRC-117F

23. EXFILTRATION:

2XHH-60, 1X MH-47 Airland

24. ENROUTE TO RECOVERY/TRANSLOAD LOCATION:

N/A

25. MISSION EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES/LIMITATIONS NOTED:

N/A

26. CHIEF COMPLAINT:

Patient 1: [b](6)

Patient 2:

Patient 3:

Patient 4:

Patient 5:

Patient 6:

Patient 7:

Patient 9:

Patient 10:

Patient 11:

Patient 12:

Patient 13:

Patient 14:

Patient 15:

Patients 16-22: Showed no signs of life

27. PATIENT HISTORY (i.e., MECHANISM OF INJURY AND/OR HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS).

All patient injuries were a result of rapid deceleration of aircraft after impact with the ground (crash)..

(b)(6)

Patients 16-22: Were brought out of the wreckage intermittently and were checked for signs of life once at CCP and then moved to the area designated for the expectant/dead. Each patient was checked by two separate medics. None showed signs of life.

28. PRIMARY SURVEY & IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WITH PT. RESPONSE: (i.e., Initial ABCDE's to include LOC with AVPU):

---SEE Paragraph 27 Above---

29. INITIAL VITAL SIGNS:

---SEE Paragraph 27 Above---

30. SECONDARY SURVEY (i.e., Complete head-to-toe exam findings. Include LOC – e.g., AVPU or GCS):

---SEE Paragraph 27 Above---

31. REPEAT VITAL SIGNS (Must include final set of vitals & LOC prior to transfer of pt. care. If not obtained, so state with explanation why.):

---SEE Paragraph 27 Above---

32. MEDICAL TREATMENT/ PROCEDURES PERFORMED & PT. RESPONSE (Do not need to repeat that already reported in the PRIMARY SURVEY (block 28):

---SEE Paragraph 27 Above---

33. MEDICATIONS ADMINISTERED (i.e., Med, dose, route, time, pt. response):

---SEE Paragraph 27 Above---

34. BLOOD USE: (i.e., total # of units used; annotate pre and post vitals above):

None

35. SERE DEBRIEF INFORMATION

a. SERE DEBRIEFER: N/A	b. LOCATION: N/A	c. EMAIL: N/A
------------------------	------------------	---------------

d. IP/E START LOCATION: N/A	e. RECOVERY LOCATION: N/A
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f. SURVIVAL/EVASION EQUIPMENT/PRODUCTS USED: N/A
--

g. POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE SERE EQUIPMENT/TRAINING/PROCEDURE ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY IP/E: N/A
--

h. CRO/SERE REPATRIATION LESSONS LEARNED: N/A

~~SECRET~~**6. INITIAL TASKING/ ALERT:**

---Pre-launch information should have painted a more accurate picture of the actual situation to allow for extra / mission specific tools, such as "heavy lift kit".

---Have intel shop provide the latest hospital staffing levels based on recent activity.

37. COMMAND/CONTROL/COMMUNICATIONS:

---Helicopters need to relay scene size up information as soon as possible, to allow the Combat Rescue Officer (CRO) to respond with additional PJs / equipment in a timely manner.

---Use of secure frequencies in target area if present for extended amounts of time.

38. TRAINING/EDUCATION:


N/A

39. EQUIPMENT:

---The need for plenty of wool blankets and watch caps.

40. DOCTRINE/TACTIC/TECHNIQUE/ PROCEDURE:

(b)(1)1.4a

**41. LOGISTICS & SUPPORT:**

---The Army QRF platoon came complete with 4 medics, 1 Physicians Assistant, Internal Leadership, and communications with (b)(1)1.4a. They were extremely flexible in executing any task asked of them with minimal PJ supervision. They were also able to produce a large wrecker and flat bed truck on site in a short amount of time. Many placed their own clothing items onto the survivors. They far exceeded their role of "site security".

42. GENERAL:

---Very rapid launch out of [REDACTED] after notification.



RANK/NAME: (b)(3)(10USC130b), (b)(6)

DATE: 18 Feb 07

COMMENTS

---See notes in Section 2, paragraphs G and L
---See Section 6

~~SECRET~~

WX Observations Composite

PRE-MISSION

(Encl E1) Flt Lead: 6 mi vis, with Haze, Sct 10,000 (MSL), Bkn 20,000,
Freezing level 8,000, possibility of light icing in precip
Flt Lead: WX update prior to takeoff – ISO Thunderstorms to West in
mountainous areas

IN FLIGHT WX: (Voice Transcripts)

(Encl F1) 20:04 Flight departs

20:39 Flt Lead requests WX – leads position is approx 10 miles South of a WX station [b](1) 1.4a due to worsening WX.

20:40 WX station near [b](1) reporting unrestricted visibility, Light Rain, Few Clouds at 3,600 AGL, Ceiling at 4,200 Overcast at 5,500.
(Note: this is exactly what the station was reporting at the time)
WX at final destination was broken, ceiling 50 with 2.5 miles vis with Haze

20:43 Lead aircraft reports visibility less than 1 mile.
Chalk 2 loses sight of chalk 1.

20:55 WX station near [b](1) 1.4a issues observation of 2.8 mi vis. Few clouds at 3,600 ft, broken at 4,200, overcast at 5,500 ft.

21:04 Closest WX reporting station (approx 55-65 miles ahead at WP57) reports 5 miles vis., light rain and ceiling of 5,000 FT (at this point the flight has been IMC in 0/0 WX for approx 20 minutes)
WX reporting station at [b](1) 1.4a behind them is reporting 2.8 mi vis With light rain and snow, 1,200' scattered and broken at 1,900'.

21:08 Lead aircraft approximately 25 miles from [b](1) 1.4a

21:08 Aircraft 472 experiences engine failure

21:20 WX reporting station near [b](1) reports unlimited visibility, few clouds at 1,300 ft, broken clouds at 9,500 and broken clouds at 13,000. At approximately this time flight lead attempted to land approximately 40 miles to the north but didn't break out of the clouds at about 30' above the ground level.

NOTE: There is no historical data on file for WX Reporting Station near [b](1) for 17-18 FEB in the Air Force Climatology Center database (Asheville, NC).

From: (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 2:11 PM

To: (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

Subject: Data

17-18 FEB 07

No data for (b)(1) 1.4a those two dates and only one ob out of (b)(1) 1.4a just to the southeast for the dates as well.

METAR KQSR 180120Z 00000KT 3200 RASN OVC// M04// A/// RMK SLPNO WND DATA ESTMD ALSTG/SLP ESTMD HIGHER TERRAIN OBSCURED ICE FORMING ON EXPOSED SURFACES LOTS OF SNOW FALOP;

Just to get an idea of what was going on generally that area, do have (b)(1) 1.4a those two days:

METAR KQOX 170025Z AUTO VRB02KT 9999 CLR M05/M08 A3002 RMK AO2 SLP277;
METAR KQOX 170125Z AUTO VRB03KT 9999 CLR M06/M09 A3003 RMK AO2 SLP287;
METAR KQOX 170225Z AUTO VRB01KT 9999 CLR M05/M09 A3003 RMK AO2 SLP288;
METAR KQOX 170325Z AUTO VRB01KT 9999 CLR M02/M07 A3005 RMK AO2 SLP289;
METAR KQOX 170425Z AUTO VRB01KT 9999 FEW180 00/M06 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP289;
METAR KQOX 170525Z AUTO VRB02KT 9999 CLR 02/M05 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP280;
METAR KQOX 170625Z AUTO VRB02KT 9999 CLR 04/M07 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP280;
METAR KQOX 170725Z AUTO VRB02KT 9999 CLR 05/M08 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP278;
METAR KQOX 170825Z AUTO VRB03KT 9999 FEW040 03/M07 A3005 RMK AO2 SLP278;
METAR KQOX 170925Z AUTO VRB04KT 9999 FEW100 05/M08 A3003 RMK AO2 SLP266;
METAR KQOX 171025Z AUTO VRB04KT 9999 CLR 05/M09 A3003 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT SE SLP264;
METAR KQOX 171125Z AUTO VRB03KT 9999 SCT055 04/M08 A3002 RMK AO2 SLP261;
METAR KQOX 171225Z AUTO VRB04KT 9999 BKN050 03/M08 A3003 RMK AO2 SLP277;
METAR KQOX 171325Z AUTO VRB03KT 9999 SCT041 BKN048 01/M07 A3004 RMK AO2 SLP293;
METAR KQOX 171425Z AUTO VRB04KT 9999 FEW055 SCT200 01/M04 A3006 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT S SLP303;
METAR KQOX 171525Z AUTO VRB02KT 9999 OVC055 01/M04 A3008 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT S SLP288;
METAR KQOX 171725Z AUTO RMK AO2 SLPNO;
SPECI KQOX 180459Z AUTO VRB02KT 9999 FEW006 SCT045 BKN060 03/M01 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP260;
SPECI KQOX 180514Z AUTO VRB03KT 9999 FEW005 BKN009 BKN047 01/M02 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP267;
METAR KQOX 180525Z AUTO VRB02KT 3300 BR FEW006 SCT008 BKN010 02/M01 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP266;
SPECI KQOX 180529Z AUTO VRB03KT 2100 BR FEW006 SCT008 BKN010 03/M01 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP262;
SPECI KQOX 180545Z AUTO VRB04KT 9999 FEW006 SCT008 BKN010 02/M02 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP253;
SPECI KQOX 180600Z AUTO VRB04KT 9000 RA FEW007 SCT009 BKN012 BKN035 02/M01 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP274;
SPECI KQOX 180615Z AUTO VRB06KT 9000 SHRA FEW007 SCT014 BKN047 02/M02 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP264;
METAR KQOX 180625Z AUTO VRB05KT 9999 FEW010 SCT019 BKN040 BKN060 02/M02 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP263;
SPECI KQOX 180631Z AUTO VRB06KT 9999 FEW008 SCT027 BKN043 BKN060 02/M02 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP262;
SPECI KQOX 180646Z AUTO 19707KT 6000 SHRA FEW013 SCT035 BKN042 BKN055 03/M01 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP258;
SPECI KQOX 180702Z AUTO VRB06KT 5000 FEW010 SCT025 BKN031 BKN050 03/M02 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP259;
METAR KQOX 180725Z AUTO 18713G20KT 9999 FEW024 SCT046 04/M04 A3004 RMK AO2 SLP246;
SPECI KQOX 180802Z AUTO 18710G25KT 2300 SHRA FEW022 SCT040 BKN055 02/M04 A3004 RMK AO2 PKWND 19025/57 SLP255;
SPECI KQOX 180817Z AUTO 18708G15KT 9000 SHRA FEW009 SCT025 BKN040 03/M02 A3003 RMK AO2 PKWND 19025/57 SLP255;

20:39:12 00:34 PI: "Windshield wiper CB popped, pushing it back in."
00:40 **Background radio:** (b)(1) 1.4a requests WX update from (b)(1) 1.4a His position is 10 NM south of (b)(1) 1.4a
00:55 CE: "So what all do we need to write up? We'll write up the windshield wipers..."
PI: "Master caution on my side."
01:00 CE: "Master caution"
PI: "That's it -- oh, APR39.
CE: "Yeah, that's the other one."
01:13 PI: "I'm pickin' some lights out there in the distance."
*PC: "Yeah, that's good."
01:39 **Background radio:** (b)(1) 1.4a WX calls (b)(1) 1.4a with WX update -- "Current 040/12 G18, Unrestricted visibility, with light rain, few clouds at 3,600 ft., ceiling 4,200, overcast 5,500."
02:08 ??: "Try again mother fucker. (Analyst assumes he's commenting that the WX is worse than reported)."
02:09 **Background Radio:** (b)(1) 1.4a wants to know WX at (b)(1) 1.4a Response is, "BKN CG 50, 2.5 miles with HZ."
02:31 *PC: "I think we're getting' in a little bit of precip now."
PI: "Yeah, right."
03:10 PI: "Unrestricted vis huh?" (Sarcastic tone)
03:15 *PC: "(Unintelligible) he's so much higher, he's up at like 800 ft. and I don't know why."
PI: "No."
03:25 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a says visibility is a little less than 1 NM on TF cue.
03:34 *PC: "Ok, 90 Knot airspeed."
03:40 PI: "Here's your 90-knot airspeed cue"
03:48 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a has lost sight of lead and is picking up further separation
03:55 *PC on radio: "Roger, we're slowing back to 90."
03:57 ??: "Got an aircraft at 3 O'clock."
04:00 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a accelerating to 110 air.
04:03 CE: "Right gun searching, no joy."
04:07 PI: "Guys are climbing."
04:10 *PC: "Climbing up."
CE: "Clear up left."
CE: "Clear up right."
CE: "4 miles out, not a factor."
04:30 *PC: "Still got 'em in sight up there?"
04:31 CE: "Right gun lost sight of the ground."
04:35 (unintelligible cockpit communication/radio chatter sounds like PC wants PI to verify (b)(1) 1.4a speed, they respond with 110 air.)
04:48 PI: "I got chalk 2 and chalk 1"
04:55 PI: "Just lost chalk 1, about to lose chalk 2."
05:01 CE: "I got chalk 2, 1 O'clock high."
PI: "That's chalk 1."
CE: "That's chalk 1?"
05:01 Radio: 1.4a informs flight he's on top climbing to 7,500. (b)(1) 1.4a acknowledges.
CE: "Left gun starting to lose the ground."
05:15 ??: "(unintelligible) goin' in and out."
05:20 *PC: "Left seat still on the instruments still on the cue."
PI: "Roger, E2 looks clean, showing a target at two miles, I believe that's probably lead."
05:28 CE: "-- and I got chalk 1 and 2."
PI: "I don't."
CE: "Yeah, they're in and out."
05:32 Chalk 2 is at our 2 O'clock, like way high. Chalk 1's up at the 1 O'clock.
05:38 PI: "Ok, I got 'em again now."
CE: "Roger."
05:43 CE: "Tally, right Ramp."
05:43 *PC: "I guess he said they're on top at 75."
PI: "No they're about level with us, he said they're climbing to 75, they're doing 110 air. We're still at 90 air, got 'em at 1.4 DME."
*PC: "Ok. I'm comin' back, transitioning to course."

20:44:43 06:05 PI: "Roger." CE: "Clear right."
06:09 PI: "Selecting course."
06:17 PI: "I got you WPT/CRS, 90 knots air."
06:19 PI: "I just barely got chalk 2 and chalk 1 in sight."
*PC: "Ok, obstacle right."
???: "Clear left, as far as I can see, just lost sight of the ground."
06:30 VWS: "OBSTACLE, OBSTACLE"
06:37 CE: "Left Ramp just lost sight of the ground."
CE: "Right Ramp just lost sight of the ground."
06:51 PI: "Climb to 7,500 ft."
06:53 Radio: 41 mentions 7,500 ft. Out of the clouds
06:56 *PC: "What'd he say?"
PI: "Climb to 7,500."
*PC: "Ok. Comin' back left."
CE: "Clear left."
07:20 PI: "Lookin' for us on the map."
07:25 CE: "- and Right Gun's pretty much lost the ground too."
PI: "Roger, still at 80 knots. At 57 expect a right hand turn."
07:35 PI: "There's your right hand turn. You're at 1.9 DME off of chalk 1, still at 90 knots air, expect to roll out now."
07:49 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a wants to know speed changes from (b)(1) 1.4a because they lost TACAN.
07:58 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a Rogers and announces, still 110 air, equals 128 ground speed; (b)(1) 1.4a acknowledges.
08:02 PI: "Course is selected -- Course is comin' in -- checking LCT's -- LCT's are good." (analyst comment: Probably a displayed Check LCT advisory)
08:20 PI: "Trying to get us on the map, here."
Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a coming down to MEA, 7,200. (b)(1) 1.4a acknowledges.
08:29 *PC: "Ok, bring us back down to 7,200."
CE: "Clear down left."
VWS: "Check caution, check caution."
PI: "Got nothing (referring to anomalous Master Caution), Everything's in the green."
*PC: "Comin' back down to 72."
08:51 PI: "Roger, you're currently at 75."
09:00 PI: "Still got 90 knots air -- Wpt/CRS selected. Goin' to 56... Getting' us on the map here."
09:18 PI: "Ok. MSA is 7,200 goin' to 55."
CE: "Did you just turn your light on?"
09:23 PI: "No, someone did -- Not me."
09:35 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a is picking up some icing and descending back down to 300 ft. TD cue.
PI: "Windshield anti-ice is coming on."
09:42 *PC: "Ok. Comin' down on the cue guys."
CE: "Clear down left."
09:48 PI: "Lost them on TACAN."
09:54 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a Descending down to 300 ft. TF cue (b)(1) will understand chalk 2, you're at 100 air... answer from (b)(1) (unintelligible).
10:05 *PC: "What did he say?"
PI: "I don't know, ask him to say again."
PC on the radio: "Understand you're at 100 air?"
10:15 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a confirms ,until he picks up separation from (b)(1)
10:20 *PC: "You get that? They're tryin' to get 2 mile separation, we're at 90 (referencing his airspeed)."
10:31 PI: "Ok. Here comes the TACAN. It's coming back on."
10:39 *PC: "Ok. Down past 7,000 now."
CE: "Roger."
PI: "You're at 1,300 AGL"
CE: "Left gun still has no vis on ground."
*PC: "Understand what guys?"
CE: "Left gun still has no visibility on the ground."
*PC: "Roger."
20:49:32 10:53 PI: "We're 2.7 from chalk 1."

21:02:55 24:17 "No, much further than (b)(1) 1.4a
24:20 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] is doing.
*PC on radio: "Ah, we're doing good, still IMC TF at 100 feet, pickin' up some icing."
24:30 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] chimes in he has quite a bit of icing, wondering what the Wx is at (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED]
Lead converses about fuel. (Analyst comment: it appears (b)(1) plans to land at (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED]
25:08 *PC on radio: Wants to know wx at (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] responds, waiting on (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] WX.
25:22 PI: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] about 55-60 miles from here."
*PC: "Roger - E2 page looks pretty flat right now."
PI: "Yeah - out there on the map the HAT shows higher terrain, we do know this is a valley, so.."
*PC: "Roger."
PI: "That's probably just higher ground."
2553 Radio: (b)(1) [REDACTED] WX passes wx for (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] 5 miles with light rain starting to develop. you're coming up on the southern edge of a cell that popped up -- Ceilings at 5,000 feet. " "Behind you at Qalat, they've got 2.8 miles, light rain and snow, 1,200 foot scattered, broken at 1900. (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] wants the ceiling and visibility (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] again then corrects himself and asks again for (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] WX passes: "1200 foot, broken at 1900, visibility 2.8 light rain and snow."
26:59 ??:" I thought that was for (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] ?"
27:05 PI: "Currently 360 feet."
27:22 PI: "Got a lot more ice building up now -- showing zero, one degree."
Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] calls (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] to inform (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] is raised; (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] is cold at this time (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] 1.4a [REDACTED] copies.
27:48 PI: "Ok. 5.7 DME, 220 ft. AGL, 104 ground, 100 knots air."
28:00 *PC: "OK. Lookin' good -- E2 page looks clean, maybe a little terrain out there at about 3 miles."
28:17 PI: "It should be Chalk 2. Chalk 2's 1.8 from them and we're -- they're 5.7 from us so..."
28:24 *PC: "Roger."
PI: "Satisfied cue at 145 feet AGL."
28:40 PI: "HAT's got higher terrain at about 12 miles."
28:47 *PC: "Roger."
28:49 PI: "The map -- shows that area as a higher elevation -- insignificant terrain, it's just, ah, you know we should have a slight climb this whole terrain's rising up in MSL."
*PC: "Roger."
29:00 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] tells flight he's pickin' up ground lights 25 miles from wpt 55. If they don't break out there, he's planning on the flight conducting an NRP approach in Gazni. (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] he thinks the WX guy gave (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] wx twice instead of (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] and (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] copies.
29:35 PI: "Lookin' good, 170 ft."
29:38 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] trying to raise (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] WX.
29:49 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] WX responds 1.4a [REDACTED] wants WX for (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED]
30:05 PI: Ok. "Lookin' good. Satisfied cue."
30:11 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] is requesting wx for (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED]
21:08:49 30:11 VWS: ENG FAIL WARNING, audio horn sounds
30:15 *PC: "-- and did we just have a --"
VWS: "Check cautions. Check cautions."
30:19 PI: "30 minute limit."
30:19 VWS: "Torque. Torque."
*PC: "We're comin' down."
PI: "Roger."
VWS: "Torque. Torque."
CE: "Got nothin' on the maintenance panel"
??: "(Unintelligible)"
21:08:59 30:21 PI: Number 2 engine fail
VWS: "Torque. Torque."

20:50:14 11:36 *PC: "Ok - Ok still coming down, 1,100 AGL."
PI: "Roger."
PI: "(unintelligible)"
*PC: "DME ??????"
*PC: "Ok. There's 1,000 ft. still coming down."
*PC: "We have a 300 ft. TF cue."
PI: "65 goin' to 56 is the MSA."
11:46 Radio: (b)(1) 1.4a informs lead, icing up pretty good. How about you (b)(1) 1.4a responds, that they are to and are descending to 100 ft. TF cue to get out of it.
11:46 PI: "Yeah, we got a lot of ice on our windshield."
CE: "Roger."

This middle section is still being typed.

Analyst comment: If this document is left as is, there is nothing-significant missing. The flight generally continues the same as from the beginning of this transcript until it picks up again.

21:09:05 30:27 *PC: Ok. I'm at 70." Document 80-4 Filed 05/29/2008 Page 27 of 65
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30:29 PI: "Roger, giving you a 70 knot airspeed cue."
30:30 *PC: "Thank you."
21:09:15 30:37 PI: "The number 2 engine failed."
CE: "Roger."
21:09:17 30:39 *PC: "There's thru 400 ft – got the torque under control."
30:42 PI: "Roger."
30:45 *PC: "Level."
21:09:25 30:47 PI: "70 knots air."
*PC: "OK."
30:49 RG: "Right gun searching for landing area."
21:09:29 30:51 PI on radio: (b)(1) 1.4a currently number 2 engine fail!"
21:09:30 30:52 VWS: Low Rotor horn sounds
30:55 CE: "No fire on 2, no vibes, no leaks."
30:59 PI: "Ok. You got 80% rotor."
21:09:37 31:00 ICS: (KY's beeping. Sound of generators off line)
31:01 *PC: "Jesus guys – hold on."
31:05 *PC: "Ahh shit." (Background rotor decay until impact).
21:09:45 31:07 (Impact)

VADR Extracts - Last Minute of Flight

TIME (Z)	Airspeed	Radar Altimeter	ENG2 Fuel Flow	Pitch Angle	Rotor Speed	ENG-2 Torque	ENG-1 Torque	ENG-2 Eng Temp (PTT)	Coll Stick Position (Inches)
21:08:40	96	138	1274	-2.4	99.5	68	66.3	636	6.28
:45	98	131	1268	-2.5	99.5	68	66.8	640	6.4
:48	99	125	1308	-2.1	99.5	69	68.5	640	6.64
:49	99	127	1092	-2.1	99.5	50	109.8	402	6.62
:50	98	132	456	-1.2	91	0	83	250	6.12
:55	98	138	138	5.7	97	0	109.8	219	6.12
21:09:00	81	323	130	7.5	97	0	110.8	207	6
:05	78	301	124	6.6	98	0	111	201	5.76
:10	70	359	118	3.7	99.5	0	106	199	5.52
:15	62	404	72	4.5	99.5	0	108.3	199	5.4
:20	47	429	42	6.4	100	0	104.3	199	5.4
:25	41	448	44	6.7	98	0	110.5	199	5.72
:30	15	450	40	8	94.6	0	112	202	6.28
:35	0	424	42	11.1	88	0	118.8	204	6.84
:37	0	401	42	13.8	81	0	129	204	7.88

OTHER DATA

	21:08:49	21:09:37
Barometric Altitude	6,386	6,681
Aircraft Weight	42,250	42,200
Air Temp	0	0
Aircraft Heading	48	56
Lat - Long	N32.55.017 E67.44.26	N32.56.055 E67.46.07
MFDs	E2 HSD VSD VSD	Hover, Hover

Cautions	21:08:49	ENG2 FAIL and ENG2 OUT
	21:08:52	ENG2 FADEC
Advisories	21:08:53	ENG1 30Min
	21:08:54	ENG1 10Min

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45, the proponent agency is PMO.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007 03 01	3. TIME 0815Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)			
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USSOCOM, SCSO J33-M			
9. (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)			

I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

17 YEARS WEATHER FORECAST & OBSERVING EXPERIENCE & CURRENTLY
USSOCOM'S FUNCTIONAL MANAGER FOR SPECIAL OP WEATHER PERSONNEL.
THE WEATHER FORECASTERS ASSIGNED TO THE TASKFORCE DO REGULARLY
MEET AND DISCUSS WEATHER IMPACTS. THESE MEETINGS NORMALLY
TAKE PLACE TWICE A DAY @ AROUND 0700 & 1200.

- SEE TWO ATTACHED PAGES

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF [REDACTED] MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>4</u> PAGES
-------------	---	--------------------------

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE OF (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) THROUHT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL [REDACTED]

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of March, 2007
at 1030 E 14th [REDACTED]

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) [REDACTED]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

B2BPK

REF: How do you explain icing > 2,000' below model?

There are several possible causes of why icing could occur below where the model indicated the freezing level was. Supposing the model was correct, evaporative cooling associated with heavy precipitation could drop the level several hundred feet. Secondly, the model could have been wrong, and the freezing level was actually lower than expected. Model accuracy is dependant by the number and quality of upstream input/observations. In this case there are only two upper air observations w/I 600 nautical miles of the crash site (+480nm to northwest and +360nm to the northeast). The limited quantity, and questionable quality (from Iran), of the inputs undoubtedly reduces model accuracy of the models. For comparison, 600nm upstream from Baghdad there is 12 data points of reasonable quality.

REF: Satellite limitation-

Not having access to weather radar, forecasters become heavily reliant on meteorological satellite imagery to "best estimate" movement and development of systems. While there's no substitute for radar, forecasting without satellite imagery would be nearly impossible. The following limitations impact there ability to timely/effectively display weather changes: Resolution: Geostationary met satellites (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4g orbit at 23,000 mile from earth and are capable of 1.5km visual (day time only) and 5km infrared (IR) resolution (day or night). This means that when tracking development of a storm at night, unless a change impacts an area greater than 3nm - it won't be visible on IR imagery. Timing: Satellite imagery normally isn't available to users until 45-90 minutes after it was taken. While this is adequate for helping track weather systems that are hundreds of miles away, it's of little benefit when they arrive. The average life cycle of a thunderstorm is normally only 10 minutes, meaning the odd of you using IR imagery (not even considering resolution issues) to identify a developing storm would be virtually impossible. Additional satellite limitation: Attenuation: relates to IR imagery where the ground temperatures mask the extent/coverage of clouds. This is normally occurs on the edges of a storm, where the clouds are thin. Absorption: is where the inferred energy is lost/decreased while moving through the lower layers of earth. Hardware issues: (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4g

Twice a year during

(b)(1) 1.4g

REF: What can be done to improve our ability to forecast/identify potentially dangerous weather?

- Multiple *Doppler* weather radars products, web available to forecasters covering aviation routes. Mountains/terrain will be a problem but I believe can be overcome with proper planning.
- More and improve/fixed weather sensors along the routes of travel; routine evaluation/accreditation of and maintenance of theater sensors
- Web access to lightning detection covering region (provided by 21st OWS o/a 25 Feb)

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

Page 3 of 4

Blank

- Meteorological satellite imagery interrogating software similar to the Air Force standard

(b)(1) 1.4a,g

REF: What explanation can you give for "0/0" with in 37nm and freezing?

Without access to radar and lighting detection it is difficult to say, but I believe that they ran into a snow squall associated with a thunderstorm. The rate of precipitation, lowered visibility, and decreased icing levels all point to "deep convection", that in the shallow atmosphere, likely extended to -22C (the point normally associated w/ thunderstorms). Squalls are considered meso and/or micro weather phenomena because of their small size and short duration; even with all the gear in the world it's nearly impossible pinpoint where they will occur. Without access to quality radar products it's impossible.

(b)(3)(D) USC 130b, (b)(6)

PAGE 4 of 4

1329nK2

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: The general authority for soliciting this information is 10 USC § 3012. More specific authority(ies) may exist.

Purpose: The purpose(s) for soliciting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the commander in determining what action to take with regard to:

MISHAP OF

(b)(1) 1.4a

17 FEB 07 AND THE RESULTING CASUALTIES

Failure to disclose:

For soldiers and civilians not being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians not being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or Army regulations or applicable civilian personnel regulations.

For soldiers and civilians being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than that certain information might not otherwise be available to the commander for his or her decision in this matter.

Routine Uses: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies outside of the Department of Defense.

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

DATE 27 FEB 07

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: The general authority for soliciting this information is 10 USC § 3012. More specific authority(ies) may exist.

Purpose: The purpose(s) for soliciting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the commander in determining what action to take with regard to:

~~misstep or (b)(1)1.4a 17 NOV 07 AND THE RESULTANT CASUALTIES~~

Failure to disclose:

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Routine Uses: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies outside of the Department of Defense.

(b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6)

VIEWED

DATE / MAY 07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing follows

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL IN (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) MENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of MAY, 07
at 154F

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

24 Feb 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Record:

SUBJECT: Weather situation for 17 Feb 2007

On 17 Feb 2007, approximately 2117Z the following weather was reported 37 nautical miles within the vicinity of the crash site of MH-47E tail number 472;


1955z there was unlimited visibility with light rain, winds were 040 12kts gusting to 18kts. The Sky condition reported was FEW 3600' ceilings at 4200' and overcast at 5500'. All heights are reported in above ground level,(AGL).

2055z the visibility dropped to 2.9375 miles with light rain/snow mix, winds were 060 10kts, and sky condition was scattered at 1200' with ceilings at 1900'

2120z there observation was reporting unlimited visibility with the rain/snow stopping. Winds were 050 at 10kts and the sky condition was FEW at 1300' ceilings at 9500' and at 13000'. The temperature was 39F at 1955z and dropped to 36F by the time of the accident.

Prior to the accident the pilots reported visibility and ceiling of zero. They also reported icing conditions. Unfortunately, the only reportable observing station was (b)(1)1.4a which also has observing capability, but only reported three observations on the 17th with the last observation was in the morning time period.

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AFM 190-45, the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram AB, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/03/01	3. TIME 1920L	4. FILE NUMBER
---------------------------------------	----------------------------------	------------------	----------------

(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Det 2, 10 CWS 7292 Nightstalker Way, Ft Campbell, KY 42223-5647

9. (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I have been a forecaster for 10 years. During that time I have supported 5th SFG(A) for 3 years and been a forecaster for 160th SOAR since 1999. I spent 3 years in Italy from 2002-2005 and returned to Ft Campbell. Since returning I've been on numerous exercises with 160th. This is my first deployment to Afghanistan and my second OEF rotation. I'm currently the NCOIC WX forecaster for 1 Bn 160th.

In Afghanistan, WX data is collected through a variety of means as far as WX observations, there are sensors and also human reporting with the sensors in place at various locations, there are back-up means with WX forecasters as dual facilitators with forecasting and observing capabilities. In other locations such as FOBs they are maintained by Army personnel. If a sensor fails then it has to be reset. Also there is WX Satellites, Radar, etc. This information is sent to AF Global WX Central where it can be pulled from NIPR or SIPR websites, looked at, analyzed and interpreted.

Most of the data is also fed into different computer programs and is used to produce different types of models such as icing charts, turbulence, convective models, etc. Most of the models do a fair job, each one has strengths and weaknesses. As far as the WX sensors located through Afghanistan I think they give us some good data, but I would rather have confirmation of the data by human source. A lot of times the sensors are marginal at best.

In the case of 17 FEB accident I don't feel that the observation were representative of what happened. Plus, when a machine stops taking observation and it goes unnoticed it doesn't get reset.

Having had time to look back at the data I had available at the time of the accident there was nothing that would have indicated ceilings and visibility would have dropped to 0 as quickly along 472s route as it did.

What is a microscale event?

A microscale event is a small-scale WX event that occurs in a small isolated area that the forecast models overlook and cannot accurately predict.

What could be done to improve forecasting and forecasts in Afghanistan?

The weather systems that would help us report and forecast here in the OEF theater would be

1) Weather radar in the north A/O. This would allow better predictability across the Hindu Kush mtns. These radars would also allow its information to be networked so that other users could pull from it,

2) lightning detection, this problem has been worked and we now have that capability

3) more weather sensors, we have requested five more (b)(1) 1.4a sensors to be placed along already established routes. The

(b)(1) 1.4a is more useful since it has better ceiling reporting, visibility, and lightning detection capabilities

4) METAT - the weather hubs and the CAOC (Command Air Operation Center), uses (b)(1) 1.4a this can provide a better dissection of WX systems as they move across the A/O.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT


PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

ONE
PIECE

ATMOSPHERIC PRECONDITIONS FOR THE 2007 WINTER GFS Model | 7 FEB 2007 00Z



OBSERVATIONS ARE FROM 2100Z

1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

1.4a

1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

OBSERVATIONS ARE FROM 2000Z

(b)(1)
1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

AMERICAN
WEATHER
AGENCY

200 300

11:15 AM 17 FEB 07 2000

E7

1.4a

1.4a

1.4a

1.4a

(b)(1)-(b)

1.4a

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AFM 190-43; the proponent agency is PMO.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007 03 01	3. TIME 0815Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST N(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)			
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USSOCOM, SCSO J33-M			
9. (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)			

I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

17 YEARS WEATHER FORECAST & OBSERVING EXPERIENCE & CURRENTLY
USSOCOM'S FUNCTIONAL MANAGER FOR SPECIAL OF WEATHER PERSONNEL.
THE WEATHER FORECASTERS ASSIGNED TO THE TASKFORCE DO REGULARLY
MEET AND DISCUSS WEATHER IMPACTS. THESE MEETINGS NORMALLY
TAKE PLACE TWICE A DAY @ AROUND 0700 & 1800.

- SEE TWO ATTACHED PAGES

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>4</u> PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____		
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.		

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT (Continued)

TAKEN AT

DATED

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] (b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FROM (b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6) WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL.

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of March, 2007
at 1030 E 15th

(b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

AM V1.00

B2R9K

REF: How do you explain icing > 2,000' below model?

There are several possible causes of why icing could occur below where the model indicated the freezing level was. Supposing the model was correct, evaporative cooling associated with heavy precipitation could drop the level several hundred feet. Secondly, the model could have been wrong, and the freezing level was actually lower than expected. Model accuracy is dependant by the number and quality of upstream input/observations. In this case there are only two upper air observations w/I 600 nautical miles of the crash site (+480nm to northwest and +360nm to the northeast). The limited quantity, and questionable quality (from Iran), of the inputs undoubtedly reduces model accuracy of the models. For comparison, 600nm upstream from Baghdad there is 12 data points of reasonable quality.

REF: Satellite limitation-

Not having access to weather radar, forecasters become heavily reliant on meteorological satellite imagery to "best estimate" movement and development of systems. While there's no substitute for radar, forecasting without satellite imagery would be nearly impossible. The following limitations impact there ability to timely/effectively display weather changes: Resolution: Geostationary met satellites (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4g orbit at 23,000 mile from earth and are capable of 1.5km visual (day time only) and 5km infrared (IR) resolution (day or night). This means that when tracking development of a storm at night, unless a change impacts an area greater than 3nm - it won't be visible on IR imagery. Timing: Satellite imagery normally isn't available to users until 45-90 minutes after it was taken. While this is adequate for helping track weather systems that are hundreds of miles away, it's of little benefit when they arrive. The average life cycle of a thunderstorm is normally only 10 minutes, meaning the odd of you using IR imagery (not even considering resolution issues) to identify a developing storm would be virtually impossible. Additional satellite limitation: Attenuation: relates to IR imagery where the ground temperatures mask the extent/coverage of clouds. This is normally occurs on the edges of a storm, where the clouds are thin. Absorption: is where the inferred energy is lost/decreased while moving through the lower layers of earth. Hardware issues: (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4g

Twice a year during

(b)(1) 1.4g

REF: What can be done to improve our ability to forecast/identify potentially dangerous weather?

- Multiple *Doppler* weather radars products, web available to forecasters covering aviation routes. Mountains/terrain will be a problem but I believe can be overcome with proper planning.
- More and improve/fixed weather sensors along the routes of travel; routine evaluation/accreditation of and maintenance of theater sensors
- Web access to lightning detection covering region (provided by 21st OWS o/a 25 Feb)

(b)(3)(D) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 3 of 4

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- Meteorological satellite imagery interrogating software similar to the Air Force standard

(b)(1) 1.4a,g

REF: What explanation can you give for "0/0" with in 37nm and freezing?

Without access to radar and lighting detection it is difficult to say, but I believe that they ran into a snow squall associated with a thunderstorm. The rate of precipitation, lowered visibility, and decreased icing levels all point to "deep convection", that in the shallow atmosphere, likely extended to -22C (the point normally associated w/ thunderstorms). Squalls are considered meso and/or micro weather phenomena because of their small size and short duration; even with all the gear in the world it's nearly impossible pinpoint where they will occur. Without access to quality radar products it's impossible.

(b)(3)(10 USC 130b), (b)(6)

Page 4 of 4

132ANK

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Authority: The general authority for soliciting this information is 10 USC § 3012. More specific authority(ies) may exist.

Purpose: The purpose(s) for soliciting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the commander in determining what action to take with regard to:

MISHAP OF (b)(1) 1.4a

17 FEB 07 AND THE RESULTING CASUALTIES

Failure to disclose:

For soldiers and civilians not being advised of their Article 31, UCMJ rights and civilians not being advised of the 5th Amendment rights: Providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or Army regulations or applicable civilian personnel regulations.

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(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

DATE 27 FEB 2007

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
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(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

VIEWED

DATE / NOV 07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Now, I declare and say that the foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL IN (b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6) MENT.

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of MAR 2007 at 15AF

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED] (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

24 Feb 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Record:

SUBJECT: Weather situation for 17 Feb 2007

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
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Prior to the accident the pilots reported visibility and ceiling of zero. They also reported icing conditions. Unfortunately, the only reportable observing station was (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] also has observing capability, but only reported three observations on the 17th with the last observation was in the morning time period.

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1. LOCATION Bagram AB, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/03/01	3. TIME 1920L	4. FILE NUMBER
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(b)(3)(10USC130b),(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Det 2, 10 CWS 7292 Nightstalker Way, Ft Campbell, KY 42223-5647

9.

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What could be done to improve forecasting and forecasts in Afghanistan?

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
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

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卷之三

ALWA Forecast Meteorogram
GFS Model 17FEB2007 00Z



OBSERVATIONS ARE FROM 2100Z

1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

1.4a

1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

OBSERVATIONS ARE FROM 2000Z

(b)(1)
1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

1.4a

(b)(1)
1.4a

NOAA WEATHER AGENCY

200 240

111 GLB 17 FEB 07 2030

GFS Model 17FEB2007 00Z

